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Social Pacts Revisited: ‘Competitive
Concertation’ and Complex Causality
in Negotiated Welfare State Reforms
ABSTRACT ▪ This article discusses three major issues related to tripartite
social pacts: first, the puzzles they present for classic theories of
corporatism; second, the contrasts between the political economies of
‘competitive concertation’ and Keynesian coordination; and third, the
problems of assessing their effects in the context of complex causality. The
main focus is on one specific policy area: negotiated welfare state reforms.
The conclusion is that though such negotiations have dominated the process
of welfare state recalibration in Europe during the 1990s, tripartite social
pacts are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for success.
Once Again Corporatism is (Not) Dead, Long Live
Corporatism!
Social pacts were negotiated in many European countries in the 1980s and
1990s, and have become a major issue in comparative research on indus-
trial relations, corporatist policy-making and welfare state reform. In a
most general sense, they can be defined as new forms of competitive
macroconcertation in which governments and representatives of organ-
ized capital and labour meet regularly in attempts to coordinate policies
across formally independent and institutionally segmented but de facto
interdependent policy areas such as fiscal, wage, labour market, and social
policy (Hassel, 2000). These new responses to internationalization and
changing patterns of production have been given such labels as ‘competi-
tive corporatism’ (Rhodes, 2001) and ‘lean’ or ‘supply-side corporatism’
(Traxler, 2001). They represent an alternative to a neoliberal decentral-
ization of industrial relations and segmentation of policy responsibilities
(Fajertag and Pochet, 1997).
The term ‘social pact’ is often used to refer to concertation at different
levels of the political system and the economy: national or macro level,
sectoral, regional or company level. The form, politics and contents of
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concertation platforms vary across countries and change over time, and
any generalizations that fail to take into account this variety among
‘social pacts’ are problematic.
This article deals exclusively with tripartite social pacts at the national
level. As the literature on corporatism has often been criticized for
concept inflation, a comment on the choice of the term ‘competitive
concertation’ is appropriate. I use the term competitive concertation
rather than ‘corporatism’ because the various macroconcertation
processes in OECD countries during the 1980s and 1990s were not
necessarily based on firmly institutionalized corporatist interest media-
tion or policy-making. Rather, they involved a large variety of forms and
practices of more or (often) less firmly institutionalized concertation;
some of the social pacts of the 1980s and 1990s were crisis-induced
processes with a comparatively low degree of institutionalization.
However, the many efforts to revitalize tripartite macroconcertation
during these decades (Fajertag and Pochet, 1997; Hassel, 2000; Regini,
2000) indicate that corporatist forms of interest mediation and policy-
making are not outdated. In the context of ‘institutionalized monetarism’
(Traxler, 2003), corporatism has proved an adaptable method; older forms
of (neo)corporatism have been ‘adapted, rather than abandoned’ and
‘were clearly surviving and adjusting, not collapsing’ (Molina and
Rhodes, 2002: 309, 312). As a consequence, at the beginning of the 21st
century, various forms of corporatist policy-making are important
features of many European political systems. Some authors have even
argued that corporatism is the one (and only) alternative to unilateral
deregulation (Regini, 2000).
Even more significant than the revival of corporatism in countries such
as the Netherlands is the negotiation of social pacts in countries that lack
a strong tradition of neocorporatist concertation: Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal and Spain. Social pacts in some of these countries challenge core
propositions of corporatist theories, being rooted neither in a long
tradition of social partnership nor in corporatist networks at lower levels
of society. Social pacts have even been agreed in political systems that
constitute ‘majoritarian democracies’ (Lijphart, 1999), with strong
governments which do not normally need to accommodate minority
interests. This is at first sight surprising and will be discussed in the next
section.
Puzzling Pacts
One of the central puzzles of the social pact literature is the growth of
concertation processes in countries whose systems of industrial relations
have regularly been classified as ‘non-corporatist’ or ‘non-coordinated’
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(1)
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(‘pluralist’, ‘statist’, or ‘syndicalist’: Schmitter, 1974). Ireland and, to a
lesser degree, Italy are prominent examples, but also noteworthy are
Greece, Portugal and Spain (and between the ‘Accord’ of 1983 and the
end of the 1980s, Australia). These countries represent anomalies for
theories of corporatism that emphasize the importance of institutional
prerequisites: well organized, centralized, internally coordinated and
encompassing trade unions and employers’ associations equipped with
considerable authority over their constituencies (Regini, 2000; Rhodes,
2001).
Second, in several countries the initiatives for corporatist macrocon-
certation have not been launched by social-democratic governments. This
supports the thesis that the close nexus in previous decades between left
governments and corporatist concertation reflected one specific variety
of macroconcertation, namely Keynesian coordination (Traxler et al.,
2001). Other varieties of corporatist policy-making and concertation,
such as corporatist governance regimes or concertation at the sectoral
level, have been common features of several continental European ‘nego-
tiational democracies’ (Verhandlungsdemokratien) where social-
democratic parties never held a dominant position. Corporatist forms of
governance in flexibly coordinated market economies (Soskice, 1999)
could for example be reconciled with the principle of subsidiarity, a
central concept of ‘social capitalism’ as favoured by christian-democratic
parties and firmly rooted in catholic social doctrines (van Kersbergen,
1995). Furthermore, the existence of liberal varieties of democratic
corporatism — ‘corporatism without labour’ in Japan (Pempel and
Tsunekawa, 1979) or with rather ‘weak labour’ in Switzerland — have
shown that the partisan composition of government has never fully deter-
mined the modes of interest group representation.
However, in contrast to the sectoral corporatism that figured promi-
nently in social capitalism, national social pacts aim at a hierarchical
centralization of negotiations and coordination procedures: they repre-
sent processes of macroconcertation. This is even true when their
outcome may largely consist in ‘organized decentralization’ (Traxler,
1995). For governments, one major rationale for a (re)centralization, de-
differentiation and re-merger of political steering capacities is to
overcome unintended consequences of segmented policy responsibilities.
The centralist tendency of competitive concertation is a major cause of
friction with institutionalized forms of delegated policy-making and
implementation inherent in sectoral corporatism (Lehmbruch, 2000;
Siegel, 2003). Though they represent rather different means of distribut-
ing and balancing political power, sectoral corporatism and the vertical
separation (or interlocking) of power in federalist political systems repre-
sent both counter-majoritarian politics. This is the reason why both fit
well with other features of consensual democracy (Lijphart, 1999).
Siegel: Social Pacts Revisited
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Though tripartite macroconcertation aims at limiting the leeway for
unilateral action, its political logic deviates from other counter-
majoritarian institutions or constitutional veto points.
The initiation of social pacts in countries with pluralist interest group
systems (Siaroff, 1999) has stimulated an intense debate about the precon-
ditions of effective corporatist concertation, in particular the ‘politics of
social pacts’ (Hassel, 2000, 2003). But as well as explaining how such
pacts are initiated it is necessary to answer two important questions: first,
whether and how these new processes are different from older forms of
macroconcertation; second, how their effectiveness and efficiency can be
assessed.
Old and New Varieties of Corporatist Macroconcertation
Many systems of corporatist interest representation and policy-making
have undergone substantial changes since the heyday of Keynesian
concertation (Molina and Rhodes, 2002; Traxler et al., 2001). Most of
these changes may be classified as ‘path-dependent’ adjustments to new
socio-economic and political contexts, but others have been more radical.
The decentralization of collective bargaining, most notably in Sweden
(Traxler et al., 2001: 112–6), the changing role of social partners in the
governance of corporatist social security institutions, as in the Nether-
lands during the 1990s (Hemerijck, 2003: 245–56), and the rise of new
forms of concertation which are poorly embedded in pluralist systems of
interest group representation are important examples of substantial, path-
deviating changes that have transformed existing corporatist processes.
Table 1 presents an ideal-typical comparison of Keynesian concerta-
tion with new forms of supply-side concertation. This is not claimed to
be empirically exact, since it cannot reflect the large variation among
national ‘corporatist regimes’; the main purpose is to highlight the key
differences between the two stylized varieties of macroconcertation.
As this simplified overview indicates, there have been substantial changes
in the political economy of corporatist policy-making since the 1970s —
for example the dominant paradigms of monetary and economic policy
— which have also transformed the incentive structures of collective
actors.
Whereas effective Keynesian macroconcertation aimed at an explicit
coordination between monetary, fiscal and wage policy, ‘monetarist
coordination’ (Scharpf, 1987), driven by powerful independent central
banks which follow a policy of (internal and external) currency stability,
resembles an asymmetric and informal signalling game between the three
policy areas (Hall and Franzese, 1998). As a consequence of the supra-
nationalization of monetary policy authority at the European level and
the legally defined competences and duties of the European Central Bank
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(1)
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TABLE 1. Old and New Concertation: An Overview
Keynesian concertation Competitive concertation/Social pacts
Main goals • reduce inflationary pressures; inclusive macroeconomic • secure or regain ‘competitiveness’; supply-side labour 
and issues • coordination; wage moderation; extension and expansion • market reform; regulatory reforms in social policy; 
• of social rights • reduce non-wage labour costs; reduce public deficits and
debts
Political • at least some capital market restrictions exist; volume and • liberalized financial markets; volume and direction of 
economy • directions of international capital transactions not a major • international capital transactions a major concern 
• concern • fight against public deficits; efforts to foster 
• fight against inflation or stagflation dominant goal of • employment growth 
• government • ‘monetarist coordination’ logic (Scharpf); 
• ‘Keynesian coordination’ logic (Scharpf) • ‘institutionalized monetarism’ (Streeck)
Interest • centralized, internally coordinated and encompassing • relevance of interest group systems uncertain; possible 
group • interest groups (unions and employers’ associations) a • negative effects of strong industrial unions 
system • necessary precondition of concertation • (Ebbinghaus/Hassel) and of employer disorganization
Wage and • wage moderation a means to contain inflation • wage moderation a means for successful competition 
labour • increased social expenditure and de-commodification as • in international markets, flexibilization and partial 
market • part of the corporatist exchange logic and as compensation • deregulation of wage bargaining process (organized 
policy • for wage restraint • decentralization); decoupling of wage agreements in different
sectors
• flexibilization and partial deregulation of employment law
Role of • moderator and broker • shadow of hierarchy
government • direct side-payments (extension of social/employment • no direct fiscal compensation
• rights, fiscal compensation) • ‘participatory’ compensation: integration of interest groups
into policy-making process
Logic of • negotiation characterized by flat hierarchy • hierarchical: asymmetric negotiation/room for manoeuvre
exchange • (short-term) positive sum games: externalization of • sequential bargaining; one-way short-term cooperation
• compensation costs an unintended but accepted consequence • ‘logic of information’ (Culpepper)
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within the eurozone, a supranational price stability regime now defines a
‘quasi-constitutional’ constraint for national macroeconomic policy. In
EU countries, macroconcertation takes place in the context of a formal
loss of sovereignty in monetary and a de facto loss of autonomy in other
key policy domains.
In general, a supply-side oriented agenda that embraces issues of
competitiveness, structural and microeconomic reform now tends to
dominate. Keynesian coordination was designed to compensate trade
unions for wage restraint by government policy to expand social rights
and, as a consequence, increase the ‘social wage’. This compensation
strategy has been displaced by the logic of a Schumpeterian workfare
state.
The process of competitive concertation is more asymmetric than in
the context of Keynesian concertation in at least two respects. First, the
power relations between the collective actors of capital and labour have
changed: economic internationalization, and the liberalization of capital
markets in particular, in combination with persistent structural unem-
ployment, has weakened trade unions. When labour was in short supply,
economic and employment growth were high, governments could reward
wage restraint and monetary policy was accommodating, organized
business had a strong interest to initiate concertation to secure moderate
wage policies. In contrast, persistent and high unemployment, sluggish
economic and employment growth, stability-oriented monetary policy
and the liberalization of cross-border capital transactions has equipped
capital with considerable implicit blackmail potential in the political
process, while trade unions’ membership base is eroding in most Western
countries.
This asymmetry undermines the generalized exchange logic of social
pacts. Within the context of competitive macroconcertation, unions are
expected to offer first-step cooperative moves and concessions: wage
restraint, flexibilization of wage bargaining institutions, reduction of
social benefits or the liberalization of employment protection legislation.
In return, they have to accept mainly uncertain and diffuse benefits for
their members (Hassel, 2000). The main short-term motive for unions to
join social pacts is to be included in reform processes (Culpepper, 2002):
they can at least use their ‘bounded influence’ to shape the outcome.
However, the short-term positive-sum game that figured so prominently
in the classic tripartite Keynesian coordination, and which allowed a
diffuse externalization of the costs of mutual compensation mechanisms,
is no longer a viable option.
A central question of research on social pacts has been whether and
how the ‘organizational infrastructure’ of interest group representation
affects the operation of corporatist neoconcertation. Corporatist theory
originally assumed that powerful and encompassing peak organizations
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(1)
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of employers and trade unions are key prerequisites of effective concer-
tation; but recent social pacts have challenged this premise. The success-
ful revitalization of concertation in the context of a serious crisis of the
trade union movement in the Netherlands or in Finland and the failed
concertation processes in Germany have raised another question:
whether a severe organizational crisis of the trade union movement may
even be a necessary precondition for effective competitive concertation.
In the German case, it can indeed be argued that unions with firmly
institutionalized power bases in corporatist policy-making networks may
be expected to resist social pacts (Siegel, 2003). The incentives to offer
first-step concessions in a rather weak shadow of hierarchy are rather
puny if unions can rely on strong secondary power resources provided
by a dense net of corporatist institutions at sectoral level. Analysis of the
German concertation process illustrates how the strong legacy of sectoral
corporatism and a relatively weak central union confederation inhibit
effective tripartite concertation. If autonomous collective bargaining is
(implicitly) constitutionally guaranteed as in the Federal Republic, the
government cannot credibly threaten to intervene in the wage bargaining
process. As a result, at least two important preconditions for effective
macroconcertation seem to be missing in the Germany variety of capi-
talism: strong government prerogatives in wage policy and a union
confederation that is powerful in relation to its affiliates.
Another, closely related conclusion which could be drawn from the
successful Dutch social pacts and the failed concertation attempts in
Germany is that as long as unions do not perceive high unemployment
and other indicators of economic and fiscal stress as ‘objective indicators’
that reflect deeply rooted structural problems, the problem definition
among collective actors in the concertation process are unlikely to
coincide and the likelihood of reform deals based on ‘common interest
definitions’ is low. As long as unions can rely on strong secondary power
resources (Traxler et al., 2001) and the costs of persistently high unem-
ployment are cushioned by social insurance institutions (Hassel, 2003),
the incentives to engage in competitive macroconcertation and to offer
concessions are weak.
Given the changed goals and context of macroconcertation, one
substantial difference between older forms of Keynesian coordination
and more recent supply-side corporatism affects the roles of government
representatives (Hassel, 2000). Instead of acting as moderators and
brokers in the comparatively symmetric or at least less asymmetric
negotiation context of Keynesian concertation, governments have to take
over a role as a ‘leading’ and ‘steering’ negotiator within the process of
competitive macroconcertation (Jochem and Siegel, 2003). An important
condition for the effective working of social pacts is that governments are
able to create a ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Scharpf, 1997: ch. 9). One 
Siegel: Social Pacts Revisited
113
07 siegel (ds)  21/1/05  10:30 am  Page 113
implication is that a high degree of institutional pluralism defines an
important barrier to the hierarchization of the political process and effec-
tive macroconcertation. Political systems in which the steering resources
of the state are only moderately centralized are therefore biased against
effective macroconcertation. Federalism for example can provide major
institutional veto points for macroconcertation processes.
Consequently, institutional pluralism and firmly institutionalized
legacies of sectoral corporatism tend to provide two types of institutional
veto potential for the vertical and horizontal integration of corporatist
macroconcertation. This has serious consequences for the political logic
of social pacts and for strategies to analyse them. Whereas most studies
have focused on the structural factors of labour-capital relations and
interest group interactions, the changed context and goals of neoconcer-
tation must bring the state back into the analysis.
Complex Causality and Competitive Concertation
In the past decade there have been numerous empirical studies of social
pacts. Most have focused on the institutional arrangements, their
initiation and consolidation, and the underlying motivations of govern-
ments, employers’ associations and trade unions in engaging in these new
forms of macroconcertation. Those that address outcomes have often
stressed that social pacts can contribute decisively to the reform of wage
bargaining systems, labour markets and social policies, and that they
therefore offer a comparative institutional advantage (Ebbinghaus and
Hassel, 2000; Hassel, 2000; Sarfati, 2003). But I will argue that empirical
evidence for the specific impact of competitive concertation in the form
of tripartite social pacts on negotiated welfare state reforms is often quite
meagre, far from robust and rather ambiguous.
One major reason is that most of the literature on social pacts has
primarily engaged in inductive hypothesis-building, mainly on the basis
of discrete case studies. There are numerous comparative studies of the
impact of earlier varieties of corporatism on wage policy and labour
market outcomes, but we lack more systematic comparative studies that
would allow a more rigorous evaluation of the impact of social pacts. A
more general problem is that such efforts would face serious and well-
known problems of complex causality in macrosociological settings. My
arguments cannot fill the most troublesome gaps in the current debate
about the effects of social pacts, nor can they provide solutions to the
problems of causal inferences in complex settings. My main goal is to
discuss critically some of the prevailing commonplaces about the effects
of social pacts and thereby to stimulate further debate about competitive
concertation.
In addition to the more general problems of causal inference based on
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(1)
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small n studies, any research input which tries to ‘isolate’ the effect of
social pacts on policy outcomes faces the difficulty that the issues dealt
in these new concertation arenas involve complex problem structures.
The main features of this complexity are, first, the high degree of inter-
dependence between policy areas (such as wage and social policy) and
second, the internal complexity of policy problems. Though it is exactly
the insight into the complexity and interdependence of labour market and
social policy problems that has paved the way for a de-segmentation of
the policy process and for a re-merger of political steering capacities
under the umbrella of social pacts, these complex interdependences cause
specific difficulties for the analysis of the effects of competitive concer-
tation on wage bargaining, employment policy and particularly social
policy reform. This is especially true if the aim is not only to understand
‘what happened and why’ in a specific country, but also to draw lines of
generalization by comparative inductive inferences. Certainly, Keynesian
macroconcertation was also embedded in a world of ‘complex causality’
(Mayntz, 2002); but denationalization and the growth of modern welfare
states, among other factors, have increased the complexity of national
social and labour market policies. Let me briefly exemplify this by
discussing the intended and unintended feedback effects of welfare state
growth in OECD countries.
The growth of democratic welfare states has generated a multitude of
social, economic and political effects (Schmidt, 1998: part III), some of
which were neither planned nor anticipated. These unintended side-
effects are of special interest when we analyse the political economy of
social pacts. Regulatory and distributive welfare state policies have
various impacts on adjacent policy domains like the regulation of labour
law and wage bargaining processes. In addition, the growth of the welfare
state has produced externalities that shape the agenda of reform policies
and call for ‘second-order’ reforms (Kaufmann, 1997). The main chal-
lenge of these second-order reforms is to correct the unforeseen and unin-
tended side-effects of policy choices of the past.
One of the most illustrative and well-documented examples of the
unintended effects of welfare state expansion and extension can be seen
in social insurance systems which offer medium to high levels of decom-
modification and which are (primarily) financed through wage-related
social security contributions. The growth of the social insurance state was
the nucleus for the institutionalization of the basic pillars of social capi-
talism (van Kersbergen, 1995). The expansion of social insurance systems
has fostered the development and stabilization of high-wage, diversified
quality production regimes, generating strong incentives for capital-
intensive, labour-saving and therefore productivity-increasing invest-
ment (Streeck, 1997). Thereby, it also contributed to a far-reaching
substitution of labour by capital-intensive production. The growth of
Siegel: Social Pacts Revisited
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social insurance institutions and the increase in social security contri-
butions to finance them produced an intended ‘productivity whip’ effect
on labour costs. However, this effect not only fostered the growth of and
contributed to the stabilization of high wage regimes; its unintended by-
product was its contribution to the development of segmented labour
markets. High social security contributions in high-wage regimes tend to
induce prohibitive wage costs for less productive sectors and labour-
intensive service jobs. As a consequence, the expansion of the social
insurance state, if paralleled by a high wage regime and a densely regu-
lated net of employment protection laws, provides the source for struc-
tural insider-outsider conflicts in the labour market. These conflicts are
amplified through a dense net of labour law regulation for those with
permanent employment contracts. Germany’s difficult path into the
service economy serves as a stereotypical example of the unintended
consequences of the intended expansion of the social insurance state and
labour law regulation (Siegel and Jochem, 2000).
The unintended consequences of the expansion of a mainly insurance-
based welfare regime are just one example of the complex interdependence
between neighbouring and interrelated policy areas and the internal
complexity of policies which have been on the agenda of social pacts. The
increased internal complexity of welfare states adds complexity not only
to the exchange logic and coordination strategies of social pacts but also
to the analysis of their real ‘net effects’.
External factors such as the amplified penetration of national political
institutions, processes and policies by international processes aggravate
the theoretical and methodological difficulties of tracing effects and
causal chains. Though social pacts may result in agreements among the
participants and pave the way for reform policies, their effect may not be
strong enough to outweigh externally generated converse effects.
Additionally, reform processes initiated by successful tripartite negotia-
tions may face severe difficulties if they reach the stage of implemen-
tation. Hence there is no guarantee that agreements reached in tripartite
concertation actually produce the intended policy effects. Numerous
intervening variables must be considered in order to assess the relevance
of social pacts for specific policy outcomes.
Inevitably, under circumstances of complex causality, it is a risky
undertaking to assess the real net effects of social pacts. Hence careful
inferences to establish causal relations are a major challenge in the search
for robust conclusions about the effects of social pacts on policy
outcomes. One excellent example that will be discussed in the next
section is the causal nexus between the existence of social pacts and nego-
tiated welfare state reforms in continental European countries in the
1990s.
European Journal of Industrial Relations 11(1)
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Tripartite Pacts and Negotiated Welfare State Reforms
How to find a theoretically plausible, methodologically consistent and
empirically robust way to assess the effects of social pacts is of central
importance for the literature on varieties of competitive concertation.
This is in general true for any empirically well-informed answer to the
question if, when and how political institutions and processes do matter
for policy outcomes, but the assessment problem is of particular import-
ance when we analyse the impact of tripartite social pacts on welfare state
reforms. One reason is that some recent analyses have shown that
concerted welfare state reforms have occurred without social pacts or
other concertation efforts exerting a major role in the process: for
example in Germany (Siegel, 2003), Austria (Tàlos and Fink, 2003),
Sweden (Jochem, 2003) and most recently also the Netherlands (Hemer-
ijck, 2003). In contrast to macroeconomic coordination and reforms of
wage bargaining systems, the findings reported by Jochem and Siegel
(2003) imply that the impact of tripartite social pacts on welfare state
reforms was in many countries rather restricted, in some cases at least
disputable and in others not observable at all.
Even those studies explicitly designed to test the impact of social pacts
have failed to deliver robust empirical evidence that these have decisively
facilitated major welfare state reforms, for example in pensions. A
notable example is the otherwise very instructive contribution of
Ebbinghaus and Hassel (2000) on ‘striking deals’ in Germany, France,
Italy and the Netherlands. Close inspection of their empirical evidence
shows that such deals do indeed seem to have contributed to wage
bargaining reforms in the four countries; but most of the reforms in the
domain of pensions policy (and also sickness benefits) included in their
analysis were not successfully negotiated within tripartite concertation
processes. Conversely, the four successful changes in the Italian pension
system indicate that a rather exclusive, bilateral variety of corporatist
concertation facilitated major welfare state reforms in a key social policy
domain.
For the Netherlands, a paradigmatic case in the literature on new social
pacts and ‘concerted reform policies’, Hemerijck has argued that the
reshaping of the institutional pillars of social policy administration has
not been based on ‘concerted consensus’: ‘Unlike wage moderation in the
1980s, welfare reform initiatives in the 1990s were measured against the
social partners’ (Hemerijck, 2003: 263). Major reforms in the Netherlands
‘re-established political primacy in the area of social security’ (Hemeri-
jck, 2003: 204). In contrast to the widespread image of the Dutch consen-
sual ‘polder model’, the institutional overhaul of the welfare state
generated serious conflicts between central government and the social
partners, culminating in mass protests organized by the unions in 1991.
Siegel: Social Pacts Revisited
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The cumulative effect of the reforms of the 1990s has been to eliminate
the role of corporatist governance regimes in which the social partners
had a veto over a wide range of issues and were not strictly supervised by
state authorities. Thus a major consequence of the welfare reforms of the
1990s has been to restore political responsibility to the central govern-
ment or to executive boards that now monitor corporatist institutions.
Whereas the Wassenaar agreement of 1982 marked the beginning of
successful tripartite macroconcertation in the domain of macroeconomic
policy, it was not succeeded by consensually negotiated institutional
reforms of the welfare state, even though social security issues have been
part of the exchange agenda in several Dutch social pacts.
The Dutch experience fits rather well with various strands of theories
on welfare state reforms. In core social policy domains like old-age
pensions and health care, the restricted room for manoeuvre in social
policy-making beyond the golden age of the welfare state almost
inescapably generates disputes over redistributive issues. The conse-
quence is a more conflict-ridden policy process than in the period of
welfare state expansion. However, redistributive issues do not necessarily
preclude techniques of formal or informal consultation and negotiation
between central government, organized business and unions. The unde-
sired consequences of redistributive reform policies can be mitigated in
several ways. Examples are various techniques of ‘reform packaging’,
based on intensive but often rather informal compromise-seeking
consultations between various collective actors. The central question for
analysing the effects of social pacts is whether they provide a compara-
tive institutional advantage for initiating welfare state reforms compared
with other varieties of concertation and (informal) techniques of
consultation and consensus building. If cutbacks in the welfare state
involve redistributive issues, there are limits to a consensually negotiated
and coordinated reform strategy. One key lesson that can indeed be
drawn from the Dutch experience of restructuring disability and sickness
programmes is that even in countries with high-profile social pacts, a
strong tradition of consensus democracy, and where policy learning
resulted in sequential reform processes that spilled over from one policy
area to another (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997), severe conflicts among the
social partners and between them and the government are unavoidable
when redistributive issues have to be resolved (Hemerijck et al., 2000:
222).
A major example of the ‘causal coupling’ of tripartite concertation with
successful welfare state reforms is the Italian pension reform of 1995
(Regini and Regalia, 1997; Rhodes, 2001). Under the shadow of European
monetary integration and a fundamental crisis of parliamentary democ-
racy, Italy’s concerted reforms became one of the most often cited success
stories for social pacts. The success of tripartite agreements in Italy is
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impressive in many respects and is particularly remarkable since there is
no tradition of effective macrocoordination, a contrast with the Dutch
tradition of corporatism and consensual democracy. From the early 1990s
onwards, corporatist neo-concertation was notably successful in the
domain of incomes policy and the reform of the wage bargaining system
(Regini, 2000). Yet the process which resulted in the major pensions
reform of 1995 provides an excellent example of the difficulty in estab-
lishing a robust causal chain between tripartite macroconcertation in the
form of social pacts on the one hand, and the outcomes of key welfare
reforms on the other.
The pensions reform of 1995, adopted under a caretaker government
headed by Lamberto Dini (who had held the position of Minister of
Finance under Berlusconi), was mainly negotiated between the govern-
ment and trade unions. Confindustria withdrew from the discussions at
an early stage on the grounds that the reform did not go far enough
(Regalia and Regini, 2004; Schludi, 2002: 125). Evidently the Dini govern-
ment drew the lesson from the failure of its predecessor to push through
a reform unilaterally, that the unions possessed a de facto veto power over
pensions policy. Consultation with union representatives and an effort to
negotiate the contents of pensions reform also offered a more effective
alternative: to incorporate the unions into the reform process and to
achieve an explicit agreement on pensions reform which would be backed
by at least parts of the fragmented Italian union movement.
The success of this approach encouraged the conclusion that earlier
reform initiatives had failed because governments had not sufficiently
consulted trade unions and employers, whereas macroconcertation
offered the decisive opportunity structure for the negotiation of a key
pensions reform. This argument is broadly consistent with the influen-
tial blame avoidance theory: sensitive political reforms such as those of
pensions, which involve an overall net loss for the majority of voters, are
only likely to survive the political process and achieve implementation
when backed by broad societal support, including major (informal) veto
players such as unions and in some cases opposition parties (Pierson,
1996; Ross, 1997).
Yet blame avoidance can explain only a small part of the Italian
pensions reform of 1995. The reform process involved an exclusive
variety of corporatism, ‘bilateral concertation’. In contrast to corporat-
ism without labour in Japan (but with similarities to corporatism without
business in Australia between 1983 and 1989), the Italian pensions reform
primarily involved a process of consultation and concertation without
capital. Employers’ associations were only selectively incorporated into
the consultation process, refused to sign the pensions compromise and
criticized the outcome as inadequate. Thus it is impossible to claim that
a tripartite social pact was the basis of pensions reform in Italy: it
Siegel: Social Pacts Revisited
119
07 siegel (ds)  21/1/05  10:30 am  Page 119
reflected a bilateral exchange logic (Schludi, 2002). Such an exclusive
consultation process under the shadow of a severe crisis of the political
system in general and immense external adjustment pressure (EMU)
should not be confused with a tripartite concertation process aimed at
balancing and coordinating the goals and strategies of collective actors in
a firmly institutionalized social pact.
The history of pensions reform in Germany provides further evidence
for the thesis that major reforms in European welfare states may follow
diverse negotiation and consultation processes, but not necessarily result
from tripartite macroconcertation. Until the erosion of basic consensus
over the major public social insurance pillar, selective forms of sectoral
concertation among pensions experts had usually paved the way for
successful pensions reforms in Germany (Hinrichs, 1998).
Up to the end of the German pensions consensus in the mid-1990s,
major reforms of the main pillar of the German pensions system, the
public social insurance schemes for workers and employees, were usually
negotiated on the basis of a broad consensus among policy experts of
the two main political parties (Social Democrats, SPD and Christian
Democrats, CDU/CSU), unions and employers’ associations and the
experts on the social insurance boards. Yet these reforms were not inte-
grated or negotiated within an overarching process of tripartite macro-
concertation. Major pensions reforms did not usually contribute to a
more generalized political exchange or coordination across policy
domains. Rather, informal compromise-seeking strategies predominated.
The major reform adopted by the Bundestag in November 1989 (Renten-
reformgesetz, 1992) is a clear example: it was not negotiated in the shadow
of explicit tripartite macroconcertation but was the result of a dense
consultation process between a rather exclusive circle of pensions experts
(Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993). The political process that resulted in the
pensions reform law was therefore marked by exclusiveness and by well-
functioning policy networks at the sectoral level.
From the mid-1990s the underlying consensus eroded incrementally,
with symptoms of a ‘defective negotiational democracy’ (Siegel, 2003).
Pensions politics became a conflict-afflicted terrain. Organized capital as
well as the Liberal Party (FDP) and the Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen)
expressed preferences for either a gradual or a radical system shift from
the traditional pay-as-you-go public pensions pillar. The declining
consensus became obvious during the process leading to a hotly debated
pension reform law adopted in 1997 under the centre-right Kohl govern-
ment.
The failure of the two attempts to achieve a successful and efficient
Bündnis für Arbeit (Alliance for Jobs) demonstrates the obstacles to nego-
tiating social pacts in Germany. Detailed studies of reforms in the German
welfare state have also shown that the political coalitions that enable (or
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impede) such reforms vary over time and across policy areas: the insti-
tutional preconditions of wide-ranging macroconcertation are lacking.
Finally, the conflict-ridden social policy reform process in France is
often seen as evidence that in the absence of tripartite concertation,
unilateral initiatives by the government to cut back and reform social
regimes evoke strong protests by defenders of the status quo. However,
whether tripartite concertation could have enabled a reformist break-
through must remain in the realm of counterfactual speculation. To argue
that the existence of a social pact would have decisively paved the way
for an agreed reform of French pensions is to assume that this is the one
‘master variable’ that explains the failure or success of major welfare state
reforms. Social pacts would then, strictly speaking, have to be defined as
a necessary and sufficient condition for such reforms.
Such an approach is theoretically dubious and immensely risky. In
policy domains involving complex interdependency, quasi-deterministic
causal assumptions are more than questionable. Given the many other
theoretically plausible components that can affect the success or failure
of pensions and other welfare state reforms, it is rather doubtful why the
lack of tripartite concertation should be regarded as the one decisive
deficiency of French politics. The lack of consensus-seeking negotiation
strategies in general and the majoritarian temptation induced by a highly
centralized political system with few constitutional veto points have
frequently figured as prominent explanations for the adversarial bias of
French reform politics.
This leads us to a more general issue in the analysis of social pacts and
their impact on welfare state reforms. The many studies of the determi-
nants of such reforms (for example Huber and Stephens, 2001; Pierson,
2001) have provided many rewarding insights into the processes of
painful reforms in hard times. One of the major lessons drawn from
qualitative as well as quantitative studies is that elegantly formulated and
parsimonious explanations are not confirmed by a very multifaceted
empirical reality (Siegel, 2002). This does not imply that we should regard
tripartite social pacts as ineffective or unimportant for welfare state
outcomes; on the contrary, they have become important characteristics
of the political economies of many EU countries over the last two
decades. In countries like Spain and Ireland, competitive concertation has
explicitly covered issues of welfare state reform and apparently offered a
consensual approach to welfare state recalibration. But there is still a
severe problem in establishing robust causal links between the existence
of a social pact and the outcomes of welfare state reforms. Though we
may agree that negotiations between governments and social partners
have played a major role in a large number of welfare states across Europe
during the 1990s, this does not demonstrate that one specific type of
negotiational mode, tripartite concertation, decisively paved the way
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for successful reform. Rather, depending on country-specific actor
constellations and institutional contexts, different negotiation processes
have predominated in differently negotiated welfare state reforms.
Conclusion
As a number of initiatives for competitive concertation during the last
two decades have proved, corporatism, once again, is not dead (Schmit-
ter, 1989), but has survived the turbulences of domestic and international
changes and challenges. Corporatist structures and processes have
remained central features of collective bargaining and policy-making in a
number of European countries, particular in non-liberal, coordinated
market economies. Because of the metamorphoses of corporatism
(Traxler, 2001) research on the varieties of competitive concertation has
mainly focused on the causes of and sources for changing patterns of
corporatist bargaining and policy-making and for the initiation of social
pacts in countries whose interest groups and interest groups systems were
supposed to lack the preconditions for effective macroconcertation.
Beyond the ‘thick description’ of the origins, consolidation and goals
of social pacts, however, systematic studies that assess the effect of social
pacts on public policy reforms in a systematic way are still in short
supply. Compared to the abundant comparative literature on the effects
of corporatism on wage bargaining and labour market outcomes,
comparative analysis of the effects of social pacts on welfare reforms
remains a major task for future research.
An outstanding problem in the literature concerns causal inference in
complex macrosocial settings. The causal link between tripartite social
pacts and the reform of wage bargaining systems and labour market
regimes is theoretically more plausible and seems empirically more
robust than the nexus between tripartite concertation and welfare state
reform. As the German and also the Dutch reforms of the 1990s make
clear, even in continental European democracies where processes of
competitive macroconcertation were established or re-established, tripar-
tite social pacts were not a crucial ingredient for success. Some of the
major Dutch and German (and also Austrian) negotiated welfare state
reforms were chiefly based on compromises between coalition parties
and various more or less formal processes of consultation and negotiation
between the governments and the social partners. In Italy, major pensions
reforms were based on a rather exclusive variety of bilateral concertation
between governments and trade unions. Rather than following a system-
atic pattern where tripartite macroconcertation in the form of national
social pacts figures as a major feature, welfare state reforms across Europe
have been negotiated within a wide variety of processes and contexts.
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This is bad news for those who believe that tripartite macroconcerta-
tion is a necessary precondition for negotiated welfare state reforms at
national or even EU level. But it is good news for those who contest func-
tionalist paradigms in public policy and industrial relations research. And
this is good news for unions that are not part of a formal social pact but
struggle to influence the process of welfare state recalibration by using
traditional policy instruments, and rely on lower-level bases of power in
sectoral forms of corporatist policy-making. Finally, this may be
regarded bad news for governments that can neither rely on the insti-
tutional infrastructure to build effective social pacts nor deploy the
power to diminish the role of potential veto players, notably unions, in
the process of welfare state adaptation.
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